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NCAA v. Lasege and Judicial
Intervention in Educational Decisions:
The Kentucky Supreme Court Shoots an

Air Ball for Kentucky Higher Education
BY SHELDON ELLIOT STEINBACH*

Academic freedom is simply a way of saying that we get the best results
in education and research if we leave their management to people who
know something about them.1
I. INTRODUCTION

F

or two centuries, American courts have recognized the value of
having educators, not courts, be responsible for making educational
judgments and for developing educational standards. That principle has
been firmly established at least since the 1819 decision of Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward,2 in which the United States Supreme
Court affirmed that a private college was to be governed, for better or for
worse, by its trustees-not by the state legislature.3 The principle has
endured because it is sound and because it has well served higher education
and the nation. American higher education today is the envy of the world,
in no small part because we have left the work of educating to educators.
"Vice President and General Counsel, American Council on Education. B.A.
1963, Johns Hopkins University; L.L.B. 1966, Columbia University; M.A.P.A.
1968, University ofMinnesota; Member, Maryland andDistrict of ColumbiaBars.
The author, in his capacity as Vice President and General Counsel to the American
Council on Education ("ACE"), served as principal in-house counsel to ACE in the
preparation of an amicus curiae brief filed by ACE with the Kentucky Supreme
Court in support oftheNational Collegiate Athletic Association in connection with
the case that is the subject of this Article. This amicus brief was not accepted by
the Kentucky Supreme Court. While this Article reflects work done and insights
gained by the author in the preparation of the amicus brief, the views expressed
herein are the Author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACE.
IROBERT MAYNARD HUTmNS, THE HIGHER LEARNING INAMERICA 1 (1936).
2 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
3Id at 681-82.
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That independence and its salutary consequences extend from the
institutions themselves to the associations that colleges and universities,
faculty, staff, and students establish to advance their aims. These associations include professional societies, academicjournals, accrediting bodies,
and athletic associations, among other types. Through membership in their
many associations, educators devise, articulate, and publicize national
standards for educational professions and programs-standards which
themselves reflect academic judgment. Andjust as the courts have declined
to interfere with academic judgments of colleges and universities, so they
have wisely tended to abstain from reviewing the educational judgments of
higher education associations. Of course, courts step in, as well they
should, when a statute is violated, a contract breached, a tort committed, or
a constitutional right abridged.4 But when asked to review standards set by
higher education associations in the absence of such a violation, courts over
the decades have spoken with remarkable consistency and near unanimity-leave the making and application of educational standards to
educators.5
This principle was dramatically tested and at least partially vindicated

by the Kentucky Supreme Court in its recent decision in National
CollegiateAthletic Association v. Lasege.6 There, the court found "extraordinary cause" to warrant reversal of two lower court rulings 7 that ordered

the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") to reinstate a
University of Louisville basketball player despite his admitted multiple

violations of NCAA amateurism rules, including playing in a professional
league overseas, signing an agent contract, and receiving preferential
treatment.8 The supreme court took the unusual step of granting an
interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction,9 ruling that the
Jefferson County Circuit Court abused its discretion by "wrongfiully
substitut[ing] its judgment for that of the NCAA."10 At the same time,
' See J. Peter Byme, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment, "99 YALE L.J. 251,323 (1989) ('The few common law limitations on
the authority given the college over its internal affairs still consist of prohibitions
against bad faith dealings and violations of overriding public policy.").
'See, e.g., Wright v. Tex. S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1968) ("We
know of no case which holds that colleges and universities are subject to the
supervision or review of the courts in the uniform application of their academic
standards.").
6Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001).
7Id at 89.
8 See id. at 80-81, 85.
9Id at 84.
'0 Id at 85.
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however, the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to clarify an anomalous
doctrine of Kentucky common law that governs judicial review of the
educational judgments of higher education associations. By failing to
analyze that broader question, the court missed an opportunity to bring
Kentucky into the mainstream of American jurisprudence on a question
vital to the advancement of quality higher education.
II. THE LASEGE LITIGATION
A. FactualBackground
Muhammed Lasege, a citizen of Nigeria, enrolled at the University of
Louisville during the 1999-2000 academic year and signed a letter of intent
to play basketball there. The university declared him ineligible on the
grounds that he had violated three NCAA amateurism rules." Lasege did
not dispute the rules violations. 2
Lasege had moved to Russia from his home in Nigeria with hopes of
eventually obtaining avisato the United States. The Russian sports agency,
New Sport, paid for his $800 airline ticket to Russia. While in Russia,
Lasege signed a contract with New Sport, under which it was to represent
him with respect to playing professional basketball in Russia. Lasege
admitted that for eighteen months in Russia he received free living
accommodations and meals and was provided a driver, a cook, a visa to
Russia, clothing, and a round-trip ticket from Moscow to Nigeria. 3
Lasege subsequently signed a second contract, this one with a Russian
professional basketball club. That contract provided that he would receive
a furnished apartment, airline tickets, and possible use of a car. It also
promised a salary, although Lasege said he never received one. Lasege
played on two junior teams affiliated with Russian professional clubs."
Lasege subsequently traveled to the United States via Canada, using
an airline ticket provided by an "individual15 who knew of [Lasege] due
to his athletics ability."16 The individual also provided Lasege with
lodging and meals and funded his visits to Louisville as well as to another
campus.

1

17

See idat 80.
12
See id at 80-81, 85.
"3 See id at 81.
14
See id
'5 Likely a booster or an agent
'6 Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 81.
17Id
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The University of Louisville knew, based on these facts, that Lasege
was ineligible to participate in intercollegiate basketball. As the university
recognized, Lasege had violated NCAA amateurism rules. To preserve the
amateur status of intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA Constitution includes
as a fundamental policy the commitment to "retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports."'" NCAA
Division I Bylaws give effect to that policy by declaring that a student is
ineligible to participate in intercollegiate sports if the student (1) "has
entered into any kind of agreement to compete in professional athletics,"' 9
(2) "ever has agreed... to be represented by an agent for the purpose of
marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation,"20 or (3) "[u]ses his or
her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport."2 '
Neither Lasege nor the university disputed that he had violated all three of
these bylaws.' However, the university helped Lasege apply to the NCAA
for reinstatement, based on the theory that he had been ignorant of NCAA
rules and "other mitigating factors."
Pursuant to its reinstatement review process, theNCAA gave Lasege's
application careful consideration. First, the NCAA Student-Athlete
Reinstatement Staff conducted an investigation. Following the investigation, the staff declined Lasege's request, finding that he had violated the
three pertinent bylaws by signing aprofessional contract, signing an agency
contract, and receiving preferential treatment in consideration of his
athletic ability.24 The Lasege case seemed open and shut; neither the NCAA
nor the university could find any other case in which a student-athlete who
had committed the same three violations as Lasege was reinstated.'
Nonetheless, the university decided to appeal the staff decision to the
NCAA Division I Subcommittee on Student-Athlete Reinstatement.' The
subcommittee reviewed all of the documents and statements given to the
staffand conducted an eighty-nine-minute hearing.2 7 After consideration of
the matter, the subcommittee concluded by affirming the staff decision
'sNCAA Di. I CONST. § 1.3.1 (2001-02).
9
1 NCAA Div. I Bylaws § 12.2.5 (2001-02).
20 Id. § 12.3.1 (Use of Agents General Rule).
21 Id. § 12.1.1.1(a) (Amateur Status).
22
See Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 80-81, 85.
2
3See id at 80.
24 See National Collegiate Athletic Association's Motion for Interlocutory
Relief at 13, Ky. Ct. App. (No. 2001-CA-48-I) [hereinafter NCAA Motion].
25 Id at 17-18.
26
Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 81.
27
See NCAA Motion at 14.
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denying reinstatement. It found that, by committing the reported bylaw
violations, Lasege exhibited a clear intent to professionalize himself in
violation of NCAA amateurism rules.'
B. ProceduralHistory
Lasege filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court, seeking a temporary
injunction to require the NCAA to reverse its decision and immediately
reinstate his eligibility. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted
Lasege's motion and ordered that he be reinstated immediately. The circuit
court reasoned that the NCAA had ignored "overwhelming and mitigating
circumstances" that excused Lasege's violations of NCAA rules and had
misapplied the NCAA's own amateurism rules. Following entry of the
circuit court injunction, Lasege was permitted to join the Louisville
basketball team.29 The Jefferson Circuit Court also invalidated NCAA
Bylaw 19.8,30 which permits the NCAA to assess penalties against a school
that plays an ineligible athlete pursuant to a court order that is subsequently
reversed."
The NCAA sought interlocutory relief in the Kentucky Court of
Appeals. That court denied the NCAA request, holding that the circuit
'
court judgment was supported by "substantial evidence."32
The NCAA next moved the Kentucky Supreme Court for interlocutory
relief. In its motion, the NCAA pointed out that it had violated no law or
legal duty to Lasege, and that under such circumstances the lower courts
had no warrant to invalidate a private voluntary association's application
of its own rules.3 3 Indeed, Lasege, like other individual students, was not
a member of the NCAA, and thus had no contract or other common law
right to challengeNCAA decisions. TheNCAA therefore requested that the
court set aside the injunction and allow it to apply its own standards in a
manner that undisputedly violated no statute, constitutional provision, or
common law duty to LasegeO 4

22

See Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 81.

29 d at 81-82.

30 Idat 82.
3 1NCAA Div.
32

I Bylaws § 19.8 (Restitution).

Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 82.

See National Collegiate Athletic Association's Motion for Interlocutory
Relief at 13, NCAA v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001) (No. 2001-SC-1 14-1)
[hereinafter
NCAA Supreme Court Motion].
34
See id
31
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C. The Kentucky Supreme CourtDecision

The supreme court granted the NCAA's request. Reversing the
decisions of the two lower courts, the supreme court found that the NCAA
demonstrated "extraordinary cause" that justified the unusual step of
correcting the circuit court's interlocutory order." Interlocutory review was
'
warranted, the court held, because the lower court "abused its discretion."36
The trial court exceeded its authority when it "wrongfully substituted its
' "The NCAA's eligibility determinajudgment for that of the NCAA."37
tions," the court held, "are entitled to a presumption ofcorrectness."3 That
the trial court "simply disagreed with the NCAA as to the weight which
should be assigned to [the mitigation] evidence" was not sufficient to
invalidate the NCAA's eligibility decision.39 The court held that such
decisions can only be reversed ifthey are "arbitrary and capricious"--that
is, clearly erroneous, and "by 'clearly erroneous' [the court] mean[t]
unsupported by substantial evidence."' The Kentucky Supreme Court
found that the NCAA ruling had "strong evidentiary support-Lasege
unquestionably signed contracts to play professional basketball and
unquestionably accepted benefits" and "no individual has ever had his or
her eligibility reinstated after committing a combination of rules violations
akin to those compiled by Lasege."'"
The supreme court also found "extraordinary cause" to reverse the
circuit court's balancing of the harms. 2 It was "clear error" for the trial
court to conclude that no interest of the NCAA would be harmed by the
trial court injunction requiring Lasege to be reinstated. 3 On the contrary,
"The NCAA unquestionably has an interest in enforcing its regulations and
preserving the amateur nature of intercollegiate athletics." Finally, the
supreme court held that the trial court "abused its discretion" when it
barred the NCAA from ever assessing a penalty against the University of
35Lasege, 53
36 Id at 84.

S.W.3d at 85.

37Id at 85.
381(d
39

I1

4o
Id (citing Thurman v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Ky.
1961)).
41Id.
42

See id

43Id

at 86.

44Id. at85.
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Louisville, pursuant to NCAA rules, if the NCAA decision were later
upheld and Lasege declared ineligible.45
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Johnstone, joined by Chief Justice
Lambert and Justice Wintersheimer, argued that the case did not meet the
"extraordinarily high threshold" forinterlocutory relief.' The dissent found
"substantial evidence" to support the lower court injunction.47 It believed
that, by carefully scrutinizing the grounds for the injunction, "the majority
chart[ed] new ground for cases involving voluntary athletic associations
'
like the NCAA."48
In reversing the lower courts, the supreme court majority seemed to
recognize the important values inherent in allowing voluntary associations,
such as the NCAA, to set and apply their own standards for higher
education, free from judicial intervention, where application of such
standards violates no law or legal duty. "The NCAA's eligibility determina' and
tions," the court held, "are entitled to a presumption of correctness,"49
it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to "substitute[ ] its
judgment for that of the NCAA."'' "In general, the members of such
associations should be allowed to 'paddle their own canoe' without
unwarranted interference from the courts," the supreme court stated.51
"Nonetheless," the court said, "relief from our judicial system should
be available if voluntary athletic associations act arbitrarilyand capriciously toward student-athletes."' 2 Thus, while the supreme court held that
the NCAA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in this case, it appeared
to permit a Kentucky court to second-guess decisions of voluntary
associations where the court found such decisions to be "arbitrary and
capricious." In leaving open the possibility of judicial review of such
judgments, the Lasege opinion leaves the common law of Kentucky
unsettlingly out of the mainstream of American jurisprudence on a larger,
and ultimately more important, question: What is the proper role of the
judiciary in reviewing the educational judgments of higher education
associations? As explained below, decades ofjurisprudence and the sound
41 See id. at 87.
"See id. at 90 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
4 7 See id. at 91 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
4See id. at 92 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
49Id at 85.
50Id at 84.
51 Id at 83 (citing Ky. High Sch. Athletics Ass'n v. Hopkins County Bd. of
Educ., 552 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), overruledby Lasege, 53 S.W.3d

at 77).
2

d (emphasis added).
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principles that undergird that jurisprudence hold that even the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard, which may be difficult to meet in many cases,
leaves courts too much latitude to intrude in decisions best assigned to
educators.
Ill. AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION HAS THRIVED
BECAUSE COURTS HAVE ALLOWED EDUCATORS TO SET
EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS

One key reason why American higher education is the best in the world
is that colleges and universities, not government, set educational standards.
Since the United States Supreme Court in Trustees of DartmouthCollege
v. Woodward 3 endorsed the right of independent colleges to be free from
undue governmental control, our higher education system has become
unique in the world for its variety and quality of institutions and educational missions. In this country, unlike others, no national curriculum or
centralized education ministry constrains educational choice or progress.
Students here can select among a wide-indeed dazzling-array of
excellent academic programs. 54
A "distinctive feature[ ]" ofthe American education system "is that the
development and maintenance of educational standards arethe responsibili' Educators'
ties of nongovernmental, voluntary accrediting associations."55
judgments about educational standards are at the heart of the academic
freedom that the First Amendment safeguards. 6 The Supreme Court has
held that academic freedom protects teachers, students, and "autonomous
'
decisionmaking by the academy itself."57
Accordingly, courts decline to review educational standards set by
educators, even where violation of a statute or common law legal duty is
alleged. Courts "refus[e] ...to extend common law rules of liability to
colleges where doing so would interfere with the college administration's
good faith performance of its core functions." '

53Trs.

of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, REFORM ON CAMPus:

CHANGING STUDENTS, CHANGING ACADEMIC PROGRAMS 35 (1972).
55 Inre Nasson

Coll., 80 B.R. 600, 606 (Bankr. D. Me. 1988).
See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (citing
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State ofN.Y., 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967)).
57 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985).
5 Byrne, supra note 4, at 323.
16
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Those principles are bedrock law. It is well-settled in Kentucky and
elsewhere, for example, that courts will not adjudicate "educational
malpractice" claims."' This is so because courts will "not substitute their
judgment, or the judgment of a jury, for the professional judgment of
educators and government officials actually engaged in the complex and
often delicate process of educating.... "
Similarly, courts refuse to review educators' decisions that apply
academic standards to students.6 ' Decisions that involve educational
standards set by educators "are beyond the scope of judicial review."'62
Courts are likewise reluctant to review academic evaluations of faculty
performance, "an area in which school officials must remain free to
exercise their judgment."'63
The precedents on this point are so uniform that one court said, "We
know of no case which holds that colleges and universities are subject to
the supervision or review of the courts in the uniform application of their
academic standards."'

s'See Rich v. Ky. Country Day, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Ky. Ct App.
1990); see also Christensen v. S. Normal Sch., 790 So. 2d 252, 255 (Ala. 2001)
("[T]he overwhelming majority of states considering educational-malpractice
claims have rejected them."); Bell v. Bd. of Educ., 739 A.2d 321,325-26 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1999) (collecting cases).
0Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317,320 (N.Y. 1979).
61 Alden v. Georgetown Univ., 734 A.2d 1103, 1108 (D.C. 1999) (noting that
the court "followed the lead of the Supreme Court as well as other courts across the
country in declining to engage in judicial review of academic decision-making by
educational institutions"); see also Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med.,
162 F.3d 432,436 (6th Cir. 1998); Pangburn v. N. Ky. Univ., No. 9700178, 1998
WL 1595522, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 30, 1998), at'd,210 F.3d 372 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000); Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 402 N.E.2d 1150
(N.Y.
1980).
62 Susan
M. v. N.Y. Law Sch., 556 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (N.Y. 1990).
63 Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 640 (4th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted);
accord,e.g., Faro v. N.Y. Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Of all
fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade and take over, education
and faculty appointments at a University level are probably the least suited for
federal court supervision."). Courts are equally loath to prescribe educational
standards. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1992);
Christensen,790 So. 2d at 255; Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr.
854, 860-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 584, 585
(Md. 1982); Swidryk v. Saint Michael's Med. Ctr., 493 A.2d 641,643 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1985).
6 Wright v. Tex. S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728,729 (5th Cir. 1968).
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IV. COURTS HAVE No WARRANT TO COMPROMISE THE
STANDARD-SETTING MISSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION ASSOCIATIONS

The sound and historic judicial policy of deference to educational
standards pertains forcefully to standards that voluntary higher education
associations, such as the NCAA, adopt. A unique feature of American
higher education is the vital role of associations in setting and maintaining
standards in virtually every area of college and university life. The various
associations comprise institutions with a shared mission (e.g., National
Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges), curriculum
(e.g., Liaison Committee on Medical Education), and geography (e.g.,
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools); constituencies such as
administrative personnel (e.g., National Association of College and
University Business Officers), professors (e.g., American Association of
University Professors), and boards of trustees (e.g., Association of
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges); and a host of other
categories.
Higher education associations' missions require them to establish and
apply standards in areas as diverse as administrative practice, pedagogy, the
conduct of research, accreditation, scholarly merit, professional qualification, and athletics. Some standards are mandatory for institutions that elect
to be bound, others hortatory; some are uniquely authoritative in their field,
others overlap. And the standards are continually being revised.65 But
whether styled rules, guidelines, principles, or good practices statements,
these essential standards represent educators' judgments about how to
advance shared academic goals. For example, education associations set
accreditation standards and determine whether the institutions they review
for accreditation meet those standards."

65

See Dan Dutcher, Sports Reform Symposium: NCAA Regulationof College
Athletics, 22 J.C. &U.L. 33, 34 (1995) (typical NCAA annual convention adopted
ninety new standards).
66See, e.g., NEW ENGLAND ASS'N OF SCHS. & COLLS., COMM'N ON INST. OF
HIGHER EDUC., STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION (1992). Courts accept these
determinations. See Wilfred Acad. of Hair &Beauty Culture v. S. Ass'n of Colls.
& Schs., 957 F.2d 210,214 (5th Cir. 1992); Med. Inst. of Minn. v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Trade & Technical Schs., 817 F.2d 1310, 1314 (8th Cir. 1987); Parsons Coll. v. N.
Cent. Ass'n of Coils. & Secondary Schs., 271 F. Supp. 65, 73 (N.D. Ill. 1967)
(recognizing that accreditation standards "are not guides for the layman but for
professionals in the field of education"); In re Brooks, 11 S.W.3d 25, 27 (Ky.
2000).
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Voluntary professional societies in the various scholarly disciplines
likewise prescribe and interpret standards in their fields, specifying, for
example, requirements for undergraduate and graduate programs. The
American Society for Engineering Education ("ASEE") thus promotes
quality in engineering education by promulgating criteria for assessing
programs and a policy on ethics.6' Societies representing educators in avast
array of fields likewise have adopted standards for education."
Education associations also perform the vital role of setting standards
of professional performance for members of the academy.69 The Association of American Medical Colleges ("AAMC") has authorized guidelines
to help member institutions address issues in medical research." And many
education associations issue standards and conduct peer reviews for college
and university administration to "further[ ] excellence in higher education. , , '
These associations and the quality-enhancing standards they establish
and maintain are indispensable to American higher education. By subscribing to these standards, members aim to advance institutional missions. The
results are beneficial in countless ways. For instance, standards that assure
quality assist students and parents in remote or less-populated states or
areas injudging the rigorousness of an academic program. Association
standards also guide colleges and universities on innovative programs and
emerging technological developments. 2' "Good practices" pronouncements
inform members of received norms and foster professional and institutional
67

See JOINT TASK FORCE ON ENG'G EDUC. ASSESSMENT, ASSESSMENT WHITE

PAPER (1996); AM. SOC'YFORENG'G EDUC. ("ASEE"), STATEMENTONENGINEERING ETHICS EDUCATION (1999).
61See, e.g., AM.
HISTORICAL Ass'N, STATEMENT ON EXCELLENT CLASSROOM

TEACHING OF HISTORY(1998) (prescribing standards for course content, pedagogic

approach, instructional resources and materials, and student performance

evaluation);

COLL. ART ASS'N, A CODE OF ETHICS FOR ART HISTORIANS AND
GUIDELrS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE OF ART HISTORY (1973 & 1995
amend.).
69
See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS ("AAUP"), STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONALETHICS (1987); ASS'NOFAM. LAW SCHS. ("AALS"), STATEMENTOF GOOD
PRACTICES BY LAW PROFESSORS IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR ETHICAL AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1989).
70
See ASS'N OF AM. MED. COLL. ("AAMC"), GUIDELINES FOR DEALING WiTH
FACULTY CONFLICTS OF COMMITMENT AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN RESEARCH

(1990).
71

NAT'L ASS'N OF STUDENT FIN. AID ADM'RS, STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE

REVIEW
PROGRAM (n.d.).
72
See, e.g., AAUP, STATEMENT ON DISTANCE EDUCATION (n.d.).
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improvement. 3 Accreditation standards advance quality by providing
assurance that a program has appropriate objectives and is able to achieve
them.74 As the Kentucky Supreme Court has held, institutions that fall short
of such standards raise concern about quality.75
Courts are particularly disposed not to second-guess educational
standards where, as in the Lasege case, the standards derive from associations and, hence, the collective judgment of many professionals and
education institutions. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
recognized and declined to review the validity ofAmerican Bar Association
("ABA") law school accreditation criteria.7 6 Courts have likewise credited
American Association of University Professors principles in matters
involving proper faculty practices' and have long incorporated higher
education associations' specialized standards in evaluating university
personnel decisions.7'
As with college and university educational decisions, courts similarly
decline to review higher education associations' establishment and
application of standards.79 In such cases, "courts are not free to conduct a
de novo review or to substitute their judgment for the professional
judgment ofthe educators involved in the accreditation process.""Nor will
courts review an accrediting body's decision to employ a set of criteria or
"prob[e] into the association's motives behind its rules."81 Rather, courts
rely on accreditors' determinations, 2 which "ultimately depend[ ] on the

73See AALS, STATEMENT OF GOOD PRACTICES FORTHE RECRUITMENT OF AND
RESIGNATION BY FULL-TIME FACULTY MEMBERS (1979 & 1986 amend.).
74 See AM. LIBRARY ASS'N ("ALA"), STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF
MASTER'S PROGRAMS IN LIBRARY AND INFORMATION STUDIES 1 (1992).
75See In
76

See id

re Brooks, 1 S.W.3d 25, 27 (Ky. 2000).

'See, e.g., Scharfv. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 286 Cal. Rptr. 227,234 n.9 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (AAUP statement is "perhaps the most enduring prescriptive
dictum in the field of American higher education."); Barnes v. Wash. State Cmty.
Coll. Dist. No. 20,529 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wash. 1975) (AAUP statement is "[t]he
most7 authoritative source regarding the meaning and purpose of tenure.").
1 See Kenny v. Fomof, 98 N.E.2d 127,132-33 (Iil. App. Ct. 1951) (incorporating standards of American Association of Medical Social Workers).
' See, e.g., Wilfred Acad. of Hair & Beauty Culture v. S. Ass'n of Coils. &
Schs., 957 F.2d 210,214 (Sth Cir. 1992); Marlboro Corp. v. Ass'n of Indep. Colls.
& Schs., 556 F.2d 78, 80 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977).
so WilfredAcad. ofHair& Beauty Culture, 957 F.2d at 214.
8 1Id at 215.
82
See In re Brooks, 11 S.W.3d 25, 27 (Ky. 2000).
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observation and judgment of experienced and capable evaluators." 3 This

rule applies foursquare to theNCAA, for"[i]t is notjudicial business to tell
a voluntary athletic association how best to formulate or enforce its
rules."
Thus, courts throughout the nation know that educational quality is
advanced when educators, not judges, are responsible for the sensitive
analyses involved in setting and applying educational standards.8 5 Indeed,

longstanding precedent of the Kentucky Supreme Court makes clear that
the courts of the commonwealth lack jurisdiction to review decisions of
voluntary, unincorporated associations unless a law is violated or a legal
duty breached. As the court held long ago: "It is generally acknowledged
that in their own field the decisions of tribunals of a society in matters of
discipline, internal economy, and policy not involving property rights are
supreme and conclusive."' The lower courts in Lasege stood these bedrock
principles on their head; the Kentucky Supreme Court, in reversing, seemed
to right them.
V. STANDARD-SETTING BY THE NCAA

The NCAA and the standards it sets and maintains are critical to

American higher education. Over350,000 students participate in intercollegiate athletics competition. 7 Athletics programs are integral to colleges and
universities; "[e]ngagement in the 'community' life.

. .

through sports

appears to lead to a deeper involvement in school work in general." 8
NCAA amateurism and eligibility rules are vital to the educational
value of athletics programs. For nearly a century, colleges and universities
have relied on the NCAA to ensure that competitive zeal does not supplant

83ALA, STANDARDSFORACCREDITATIONOFMASTER'SPROGRAMSINLIBRARY

AND INFORMATION STUDIES, at 3 (1992). See also Med. Inst. of Minn. v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Trade & Technical Schs., 817 F.2d 1310, 1314 (8th Cir. 1987); Parsons
Coll. v. N. Cent. Ass'n of Colls. & Secondary Schs., 271 F. Supp. 65,73 (N.D. Ill.

1967).

Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1976).
v. Georgetown Univ., 734 A.2d 1103, 1108 (D.C. 1999).
86 Wilkins v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 99 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Ky. 1936); see also
8sSee Alden

O'Neil v. O'Connell, 189 S.W.2d 965,967 (Ky. 1945).
87NATIONAL COLLEGIATEATHEIcAssocATION, COMPOSITION OF THENCAA
7 (n.d.), at http://www.ncaa.org (Sept. 1, 2001).

88 Richard E. Lapchick, The Student-Athlete, 1988 NEW PERSPECTIVES 35, 36
(1988); accord NCAA, 2000 NCAA Division I, HI & III Graduation-Rates
Summary 2 (2001).
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sound educational principles and concern for student well-being. "One of
the NCAA's primary objectives is to promote fair competition among its
member institutions by maintaining uniform standards of scholarship,
sportsmanship and amateurism." 9 The NCAA seeks "to promote and
develop educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence and
athletics participation." ° College and university presidents are involved in
NCAA governance to ensure that NCAA standards and determinations,
while independent of the views of any one school or group of schools,
reflect educators' collective judgments. 9'
The principle of amateurism is basic to intercollegiate athletics. The
NCAA, in order to transmit its system of values, must retain "a clear line
of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports."92
Student involvement in sports "should be motivated primarily by education
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived." Because
"[s]tudent participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation," the
NCAA Constitution states that "student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises."" The NCAA
accordingly prohibits student-athletes from signing professional contracts
or agent contracts. 95
This basic proscription against professional athletes in intercollegiate
sports protects students' academic experience, promotes fair competition,
and imparts the value of amateurism. NCAA eligibility rules also advance
the educational mission by teaching the value of physical fitness, selfdiscipline, teamwork, sportsmanship, and competition for their own sake,
not for material reward.' Thus, an overriding NCAA goal is to ensure,
through national amateurism and eligibility rules, that student-athletes are
truly amateurs and not, in fact, professionals. The NCAA was true to that
goal in the Lasege matter when it declined to reinstate Lasege to amateur
status after he concededly had violated multiple amateurism rules.
Although it found no violation ofany statute, no breach of contract, and
no tort, the trial court in Lasege nonetheless overturned the NCAA's
89 Karmanos

v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258,259 (6th Cir. 1987).
o Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
91See NCAA, 2000-01 NCAA DivisionI Manual 22-25 (2000).
9 NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (Miss. 1977) (citing the NCAA
constitution).
9 NCAA DIV. I CONST. § 2.9 (2001-02).
94 Id.

95 NCAA

Div. I Bylaws §§ 12.1.1., 12.2.5.1, 12.3.1 (2001-02).
96See NCAA Div. I CoNsT. § 2.9 (2001-02).
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reasoned application of its own rules.97 The ruling, which as shown above
contravened settled Kentucky law, ifupheld, also would have abridged the
NCAA's First Amendment right of associational freedom. The United
States Supreme Court recently made clear that private associations have a
First Amendment expressive associational right that protects them from
"[g]overnment actions that may unconstitutionally burden this freedom." '
That right is violated where (1) governmental action would significantly
affect the group's ability to "advocate public or private viewpoints,"' and
(2) the action is not justified "by regulations adopted to serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms."" °
The lower court rulings in Lasege violated the NCAA's associational
rights under that test. Undeniably, the ruling "significantly affected" the
NCAA's overriding expressive mission to "promote fair competition among
its member institutions by maintaining uniform standards of scholarship,
sportsmanship and amateurism,"' ° and to establish "a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.""0 Forcing
the NCAA to permit admitted professionals such as Lasege to compete
would send a directly conflicting message to student-athletes and the
public. "[C]ourt-ordered waiver' ofNCAA rules would "compromise[ ] the
educational purpose of the NCAA."'' And surely no compelling state
interest would be served by a rule that subjected a voluntary association's
decisions to judicial reversal in the absence of any statutory violation or
breach of legal duty.
Adoption ofthe flawed lower court holding inLasegethus would have
compromised voluntary higher education associations' ability to maintain
standards necessary to their missions. Such a holding would have grave
implications. For example, were voluntary associations' internal decisions
subjected to judicial review in the absence of any legal violation, a
professor who believed that a professional society wrongly rejected his
scholarly work for publication in ajournal could obtain judicial review of

See NCAA Supreme Court Motion at 13.
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,648 (2000).
Id at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13
(1988)).
100 Id (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
'o' Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258, 259 (6th Cir. 1987).
10 NCAA v. Gillard, 352 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (Miss. 1977).
103 Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1071 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
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the decision's academic merit. A student could obtain review of accreditation standards applied to the college at which he received low grades. A
university researcher who invested in a company that promoted his research
could sue associations that prescribe conflict of interest guidelines. And a
disgruntled athlete could sue to invalidate an athletics association's
application of a lawful eligibility standard-as in Lasege. Such results,
contrary to sound jurisprudence,1M obviously would impede quality higher
education.
For all of these reasons, voluntary associations in higher education
must remain free to maintain standards when doing so violates no law. The
mainstream ofAmericanjurisprudence recognizes that important principle.
By reversing the contrary decisions of the lower courts, the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Lasege seemed to steer a course beneficial to higher
education in the Commonwealth by letting educators, not judges, set and
apply educational standards. But by leaving open the door to judicial
review of voluntary association decisions that a court may deem "arbitrary
and capricious," even where the associations violate no law, the supreme
court left obscure precisely whatLasegeentails for such cases in the future.
At the next opportunity, the court ought to close that door, passage through
which will do higher education in Kentucky no good.

"'See,e.g., Med. Inst. of Minn. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Trade & Technical Schs., 817
F.2d 1310, 1314(Sth Cir. 1987); Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634,639-40(4th Cir.
1979).

